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J. J. DUKEMINIER, JR.*
Zoning for aesthetic objectives is a perplexing problem. According to traditional
doctrine the community may not use the police power to accomplish primarily
aesthetic objectives, but planners and lawyers have long had serious doubts whether
in fact this doctrine describes what courts have done in the past in approving
ordinances, whether it may be used to predict what they will do in the future, and
whether it states a desirable norm for decision. The problem has been rather fully
explored elsewhere along lines of traditional legal analysis,1 and in view of the
previous studies perhaps a more fruitful contribution can be made here by looking
at the problem and the doctrine from a different perspective.
The primary object of this article will be to examine contemporary doctrine as an
instrument of community policy and to focus attention upon its adequacy as an
implement of the sound judicial skepticism from which it emanates. As will ap-
pear, the dearth of good empirical studies in the field of aesthetics seriously im-
pedes the full consideration of many facets of the problem of zoning for aesthetic
objectives, and the ideas and conclusions expressed herein are not comprehensively
developed. Many of the ideas and conclusions also are tentative and subject to ex-
ception, although expressed without qualification. It is hoped, however, that this
article will stimulate more thinking about the types of aesthetic control rational land
planning requires, which is the basic issue.
THE ExIsrNG CONFUSION
The usual statement of doctrine is that the police power cannot be used to
accomplish purely aesthetic' objectives, but that aesthetic objectives may be taken
*A.B. 1948, Harvard University, LL.B. 1951, Yale Law School. Associated with Davidson, Dawson,
and Clark, New York, 1951-1953. Member of the New York bar. Assistant Professor of Law, Uni-
versity of Minnesota.
'A comprehensive technical analysis with a good collection of cases may be found in Rodda, The
A4ccomplishment of Aesthetic Purposes Under the Police Power, 27 So. CALIF. L. REV. 149 (x954). See
also Donnelly, The Police Power and Esthetic Zoning, 5 J. B. A. KAN. 215 (x937); Gardner, The Massachu-
setts Billboard Decison, 49 HAav. L. REV. 869 (1936); Light, Aesthetics in Zoning, 14 MiNN. L. Rav.
109 (930); Baker, Aesthetic Zoning Regulations, 25 Mic. L. REV. 124 (1926); Larremore, Public
Aesthetics, 20 H~Itv. L. Rav. 35 (19o6). For a different doctrinal approach see Noel, Unaesthetic Sights
as Nuisances, 25 CAN. L Q. 17 (1939).
' The word "aesthetic" is many hued. It was first applied in Germany by Baumgarten in 1750 to
appreciation and criticism of the beautiful. Next, Kant applied it to the "science" or "metaphysics" of
sensuous perception. According to i OXFORD ENGLISH D1erroNAxY 147 (1933), ".... Baumgarten's use
of aesthetik found popular acceptance, and appeared in England after 1830, though its adoption was
long opposed. Recent extravagances in the adoption of a sentimental archaism as the ideal of beauty
have still further removed aesthetic and its derivatives from their etymological and purely philosophical
meaning." Although the Dictionary goes on to say Kant's meaning is now obsolete, F. S. C. Northrop
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into consideration where for reasons of public health, safety or morals3 the zoning
regulation may be sustained as a proper exercise of the police power. In order to
view this formulation in perspective it is necessary to make a short detour here into
history.
Early in this century, community officials, responding to outraged popular sensi-
bilities, began to take action against billboards and advertising posters which had in
the eighteen nineties suddenly mushroomed on most every vacant lot. Ordinances
and statutes were passed regulating, and in some instances entirely prohibiting, bill-
boards. Most of these regulations were quickly killed by the courts which held
that such regulations, having been enacted for aesthetic objectives alone, were with-
out the scope of the police power Yet with the ever-widening desecration of the
landscape and with the public outcry against billboards, it seems inevitable that
the courts would not long restrain the community officials. And the courts did not.
The Missouri Supreme Court in 1911 in St. Louis Gunning Advertising Co. v.
St. Louis' provided the doctrinal shift by taking the postulate that the police power
might be exercised to protect community health, safety, and morals and then finding,
as facts, that billboards6
... endanger the public health, promote immorality, constitute hiding places and retreats
for criminals and all classes of miscreants. They are also inartistic and unsightly. In
cases of fire they often cause their spread and constitute barriers against their extinction;
and in cases of high wind, their temporary character, frail structure and broad surface,
render them liable to be blown down and to fall upon and injure those who may happen
to be in their vicinity. The evidence shows and common observation teaches us that
the ground in the rear thereof is being constantly used as privies and dumping ground
has recently resurrected and applied the word i la Kant; see THE MEETING Or E~sT AND WEST C. 12
0946).
The Oxford English Dictionary gives two current uses of the word (p. 148):
2. Of or pertaining to the appreciation or criticism of the beautiful.
3. Of persons, animals: Having or showing an appreciation of the beautiful or pleasing; tasteful, of
refined taste. Of things: In accordance with the principles of good taste (or what is conventionally re-
garded as such)."
To these uses I append a qualification. In this article the only phenomena to which the word
will be applied will be phenomena evident to sight only, not discernible by the other senses. To avoid
confusion, however, I might point out that the word is essentially multiordinal and its meaning will
vary herein with the context in which it is used.
Sometimes welfare is added to health, safety or morals. Welfare would seem to give the courts
a ready-made word to use when and if they openly recognize the aesthetic factor.
Caveat: some courts do not use the doctrine herein discussed. See infra notes 1g, 55, 70.
'Ordinances held invalid in Crawford v. Topeka, 51 Kan. 756, 33 Pac. 476 (1893); People v.
Green, 85 App. Div. 400, 83 N.Y.S. 460 (ist Dep't 1903); Bill Posting Sign Co. v. Atlantic City,
71 N.J.L. 72, 58 At. 342 (904); Bryan v. Chester, 212 Pa. 259, 6i Ad. 894 (1905); Chicago v. Gun-
ning System, 214 Ill. 628, 73 N.E. 1035 (1905); Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting Co., 72 N.J.L. 285, 62
At. 267 (19o5); State v. Whitlock, 149 N.C. 542, 63 S.E. 123 (i908); Varney & Green v. Williams,
155 Cal. 318, 1oo Pac. 867 (igog); People ex rel. Wineburgh v. Murphy, 195 N.Y. 126, 88 N.E. 17
(9o9); Curran Co. v. Denver, 47 Colo. 221, 107 Pac. 261 (igio); Haller Sign Works v. Physical
Culture Training School, 249 Ill. 436, 94 N.E. 920 (1911).
235 Mo. 99, 137 S.W. 929 (9W1), appeal dismissed, 231 U.S. 761 (19X3).
6235 Mo. at 145, 137 S.W. at 942.
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for all kinds of waste and deleterious matters, and thereby creating public nuisances and
jeopardizing public health; the evidence also shows that behind these obstructions the
lowest form of prostitution and other acts of immorality are frequently carried on, almost
under public gaze; they offer shelter and concealment for the criminal while lying in
wait for his victim; and last, but not least, they obstruct the light, sunshine, and air,
which are so conducive to health and comfort.
The earlier cases had regarded aesthetic objectives as the predominating motive
of billboard regulation and condemned the regulations for that reason; St. Louis
Gunning initiated the deliquescence of earlier doctrine by regarding as primary
the motives of safety, health, and morality and by sustaining the regulation for that
reason.
From St. Louis Gunning and later cases following it emerged the postulates of
contemporary doctrine:
(a) the police power may not be used to attain objectives primarily aesthetic; but
(b) the police power may be used to attain objectives primarily related to health,
safety or morals;
based upon the following proposition of fact:
(a) billboards and signs are primarily deleterious to health, safety or morals.
Strictly speaking, this proposition is an unproven hypothesis, and there is strong
reason to suspect that it is contrary to fact in most contexts. It is important to de-
termine if the underlying proposition of fact is true, for if it is not true and if in deed
(if not in word) the courts sustain regulation of billboards, then it will have to be
admitted that the doctrine is an inadequate description of the factors that move de-
cision in this context of fact.
It seems plain that the primary offense of billboards is ugliness. Any jerry-built
billboard may of course be a menace to safety and a fire hazard, but the billboard
regulations are not limited to keeping the signboard screws tight. Limitations are
placed upon size, positions, and frequency of placement. In some areas billboards
have been entirely prohibited,7 although the unsafe aspects might be easily obviated
by proper construction requirements.
'CoLO. STAT. ANN. c. 48, §403(4)-(7) (1953 Supp.). Prohibited within 500 feet of scenic parkway
or within 25o feet of any historic monument, shrine, or similar object, or if obstructing any "scenic
view" designated as such by the Secretary of State. Secretary may order removal of sign "unsightly
by reason of lack of maintenance and repair."
CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. §4688 et seq. (1949). Prohibited within 1oo feet of any public park, play-
ground, cemetery or state forest, or within 15 feet of any highway.
DEL. CODE ANN. §1103 el seq. (1953)- Prohibited within 25 feet of park, playground, school,
church or highway.
FLA. STAT. ANN. c. 479.1I(1) (1952). Prohibited within xoo feet of any public park, playground,
school, church or cemetery.
IDAHO CODE §18-7017 (1947). Prohibited to paint or place advertising sign on any rock or similar
natural object.
ME. REv. STAT. c. 2o, §116 (1944). Prohibited within 300 feet of any public park, playground,
school, church, cemetery or reservation, or within 5o feet of any highway.
MINN. STAT. ANN. §16.57 (1945). Prohibited within %/ mile of capitol.
NEv. Coap. LAws §264 (Hillyer, 1929). Prohibited if signs "destroy the natural beauty of the
scenery."
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In business districts billboards and advertising signs have been prohibited unless
the signs refer to business conducted or products sold on the premises. This pro-
vides a good illustration of the true objectives of community officials in acting against
billboards and of the contrary-to-fact proposition of fact necessary under traditional
doctrine to sustain this action. In the recent case of Murphy, Inc. v. Westport,' the
plaintiff billboard company asked for an injunction restraining the enforcement of
the provision in Westport's zoning ordinance which prohibited "Billboards or ad-
vertising signboards . .. in all business districts except as they refer to business
conducted on the property on which the billboards stand." The object of the ex-
ception in this sweeping prohibition is to make community action more palatable to
local shopkeepers who wish to advertise their wares (and who are also sometime
voters). The provision strikes primarily at billboard companies which erect bill-
boards on vacant lots. For a city wishing to rid itself of all billboards, it is an
expedient compromise. The Superior Court granted an injunction on the ground
that this classification was unreasonable and "illegally discriminative"; it found the
regulations contained "no provisions as to size, construction or site designed to
insure the safety of the public; ...the advertising matter appearing on the sign
determines its safety to the public. Of course this is nonsense."9 It likewise dis-
missed the contention that the classification was reasonably related to public health
or morals. The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors reversed. It stated:10
In the earlier cases, courts apparently did not realize as clearly as they do now, as the
result of facts found upon various trials, that billboards may be a source of danger to
travelers upon highways through insecure construction, that accumulations of debris
N. Y. CoNsE vAToIN LAw §675 (McKinney, 195). Prohibited within 500 feet of parks and park-
ways. N. Y. PuBLic Autmoru Es LAw §5 69-b. Prohibited within 500 feet of the Bronx-Whitestone
bridge and the Brooklyn-Battery bridge [tunnel?].
N. C. GEN. STAT. §io5-86 (1949). Prohibited within 200 feet of entrance to school, church, or
public institution.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, §655.2 (Purdon, 1942). Prohibited within 500 feet of Rim Parkway.
S. D. CODE §28.0905 (1939). Prohibited within 300 feet of any cemetery.
VT. STAT. §7689 (1947). Prohibited within 300 feet of any park, playground or cemetery.
VA. CODE §33-317 (x950). Prohibited within 500 feet of parks, parkways, playgrounds, and cemc-
teries.
Was'r VA. CODE ANN. §1721(57) (1949). Prohibited within 5oo feet of any park, playground,
school, church, or cemetery.
a 131 Conn. 292, 4o A.2d 177 (1944).
'Murphy, Inc. v. Westport, Record, Vol. A-2oi, p. ii. In surveying the history of billboard regu-
lation, the Superior Court was refreshingly candid (at pp. 16, 11): "The earlier attitude appears to
have been that billboard regulation was simon-pure aesthetic regulation and as such was condemned.
Adverse public opinion against unsightly signs along highways quite probably had much to do in the
rapid change of legal thought. This public opinion was not concerned with thoughts of safety, morals
or welfare. It was occasioned by the disfigurement of the landscape and by the marring of the beauty
of Nature. Yet the courts, somewhat sophistically, it seems to me, with many protestations against
the use of aesthetic standards, urged with rather fantastic reasoning that what previously had no rela-
tionship to public safety had now developed into a public menace which an enlightened community
not only had a right to regulate but, indeed, would be almost wayward in failing to control. . . . Bill-
board regulation is within the police power, regardless of whether one relies on the reasons to which
the courts still cling or on those which are treated like step-children, but which, at least to my satis-
faction, furnish the hidden impelling motive for modern legal thought."10 131 Conn. 295, 297, 303, 40 A.2d 178, 179, 182.
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behind and around them may increase fire hazards and produce unsanitary conditions,
that they may obstruct the view of operators of automobiles on the highway and may
distract their attention from their driving, that behind them nuisances and immoral acts
are often committed, and that they may serve as places of concealment for the crim-inal ....
As far as the record shows, the trial court did not have before it any adequate basis
of facts upon which to determine that the invalidity of the provisions of the ordinance in
question had been established. If we were to sustain its decision, we would in effect be
holding that, as a matter of law, the legislative body cannot, with such exceptions as are
provided in the ordinance before us, constitutionally prohibit billboards in the business
zones of any of our towns, no matter what may be the circumstances or justification which
existed in the particular case. We cannot so hold.
As the trial court did not have before it sufficient facts to enable it to determine
whether or not the plaintiffs were entitled to relief, we must remand the case for further
proceedings. (italics supplied.)
What kind of facts did the court want the trial court to consider? Facts tending
to prove that the prohibition of all signs except those advertising goods sold on the
premises promoted public safety and lessened traffic hazards? The Superior Court
considered and rejected such evidence. Facts showing that the prohibited billboards
created a danger to public health? Facts showing that billboards in open fields in-
creased the danger of fire more than signs attached to buildings? Facts showing
that nasty things go on behind billboards and that they afford hiding places for
criminals and cops? Except in rare, isolated cases such facts are simply unattain-
able. For instance, a special master in the next-door state of Massachusetts, where
the factual contexts should be fairly similar, after hearing evidence for 114 days
found: 1
In some isolated cases, certain signs and billboards in this Commonwealth have been
used as screens to commit nuisances, hide law breakers, and facilitate immoral practices.
Around some few filth has been allowed to collect, and some have shut out light and
air from dwelling places. In and around others, rubbish and combustible materials
have been allowed to collect, which to some degree tends to create a fire hazard. Those
instances were all so rare, compared with the total number of signs and billboards in
existence, that I am unable to find upon the evidence that signs and billboards, in general,
as erected and maintained in this Commonwealth, have screened nuisances, or created a
danger to public health or morals, or facilitated immoral practices, or afforded a shelter
for criminals, or created or increased the danger of fire, or hindered firemen in their
work.
One of the more recent examples of community action against offensive adver-
tising signs is the prohibition of signs overhanging the sidewalks in fashionable
shopping areas. Although New York has long prohibited overhanging signs on
Fifth Avenue, Park Avenue, and other East Side and downtown streets,12 only re-
"General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Dep't of Public Works, 289 Mass. 149, 170, 193 N.E. 799,
809 (1935), appeal dismssed, 297 U.S. 725 (1936).
"2N. Y. CiTY ADMiNisTrA vE CODE c. 26, §B26- 7.o. The attractiveness of Fifth Avenue to a large
extent may be credited to the Fifth Avenue Association, founded in 1907, which is a voluntary organiza-
tion of merchants in the Fifth Avenue area that works closely with city officials in controlling the
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cently have other cities become interested in achieving the Fifth Avenue "un-
cluttered look" on certain of their main business arteries. In two recent cases the
ordinances of Detroit and Minneapolis prohibiting overhanging signs on fashion-
able Woodward and Nicollet Avenues respectively were upheld.' 3 The city officials
were pretty clearly not much concerned about safety, for if signs hanging from the
best stores in town are really unsafe, reason demands that shabby ones hanging from
stores in a low-price district also be prohibited. The practical result is that people
who shop the best stores have aesthetic preferences which may be recognized and
protected by community officials.
While it is difficult to determine what is the primary offense of much land
use, the simulation of blindness affords a simple rule-of-thumb: if a use is offensive
to persons with sight but not offensive to a blind man in a similar position, the
use is primarily offensive aesthetically. Applying this rule to the regulation of
outdoor advertising, it seems dear that except in certain areas where signs provide
dangerous distraction to traffic their offense is primarily their unsightliness. Is a
well-constructed billboard or overhanging sign inimical to a blind man's safety,
health or morals? Does it offend him in any way? The function of advertising
signs is visual solicitation, and their offensiveness would seem to lie in the fact
that their assault on the eyes in some contexts is most unpleasant.
Where courts have allowed community officials to prohibit what are in reality
aesthetically objectionable land uses, their language indicates that they have closed
their eyes to the real underlying facts. Yet what courts say and what courts do
are two different things, and it is not proper to conclude from their language
that courts do not kno-,; what is going on. Except in so far as the doctrine ensnares
the unwary planner or judge who puts excessive faith in the plain meaning
of words, it does not prevent any court from holding that community officials may
zone for aesthetic objectives. But it seems to me that the doctrine may properly be
criticized as meaningless theory, i.e., it does not describe past court response nor
enable one to predict future court response. More will be said of this later. More
important, and partly resulting from its aforementioned inefficacy, it appears to be
an inadequate formulation of community objectives and an unnecessary hindrance to
devising the most efficient means of achieving these objectives.
CLARIFICATION OF COMMUNITY OBJECTIV
What are the community objectives here? They must be clarified if the inade-
quacy of contemporary doctrine is to become evident and courts are to function
as they should. It is difficult to know how far back toward basic value premises
design of buildings and advertising signs. To encourage high standards of design the Association makes
biennial architectural awards for the best facades on new and altered buildings. See Coffin, beauty or bust,
Promenade, May, 1950.
13 1426 Woodward Avenue, Inc. v. Wolff, 312 Mich. 352, 2o N.W.2d 217 (1945); Oscar P. Gustafson
v. Minneapolis, 231 Minn. 271, 42 N.W.ad 8o9 (950). Cf. Preferred Tires v. Hempstead, X73 Misc.
io07, xg N.Y.S.2d 374 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Mallory v. New Rochelle, 184 Misc. 66, 53 N.Y.S.ad 643 (Sup.
Ct. 1944), affirmed without opinion, 295 N.Y. 712 (1946).
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one must go in order to achieve the needed clarity. It is best perhaps to begin with
some of what appear to me to be the merest truisms pertinent to the problem. These
will sound very dogmatic, but I hope to elucidate and justify them in what will
follow.
Among the strongest preferences of our society is for land use to be determined
largely by private volition, and legal doctrine which implements this preference is
a social hypothesis that goal values can more readily be achieved with a minimum
of community intervention.'4 The St. Louis Gunning doctrine is such an hypoth-
esis. Individuals using their land as they desire are expected to increase total
community wealth, encourage self-respect, and foster healthier and more beautiful
surroundings. Thus we prefer that community officials should not intervene in the
allocation and planning of land use unless the privately determined use of land
deprives other persons within the community of basic values, among which is the
enjoyment of beauty by a wide number of people. Because the interests of par-
ticular individuals are not always compatible at the points of most intense reaction
(e.g., a particular land use, such as a billboard, which increases the wealth of one
person may be to others aesthetically offensive in certain contexts), community
officials must sometimes intervene to secure the maximization of all community
values. According to our basic social hypothesis, this intervention should occur only
when community values are seriously damaged or threatened by specific uses of
land. It is for the purpose of achieving the optimum use of its resources and de-
ciding when individual use seriously impedes this achievement, that the com-
munity establishes planning boards and courts which shape land use practises and
attendant legal doctrines. Precisely under what conditions community values are
seriously damaged by individual action is a problem which seldom or never admits
of a simple answer, but the answer is more easily reached if it is kept in mind that
the ultimate objective of the community is to secure a use of land which promotes
the most values for the most people' 5 and facilitates the harmonious functioning of
residential, recreational, industrial and business areas.
Now it seems fairly clear that among the basic values of our communities, and
of any society aboriginal or civilized, is beauty. Men are continuously engaged in
its creation, pursuit, and possession; beauty, like wealth, is an object of strong human
desire.16 Men may use a beautiful object which they possess or control as a basis
"See Mmas S. McDOUGASL AND DAVID HABER, PROPERTY, WEALTH, LAND 113 (1948), and sources
cited therein at page 14.
"
6 For development of a particular set of interdependent values, see Lasswell and McDougal, Legal
Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L. J. 203 (1943).
1" "The fine arts . . . are by no means the only sphere in which men show their susceptibility to
beauty. In all products of human industry we notice the keenness with which the eye is attracted to the
mere appearance of things: great sacrifices of time and labour are made to it in the most vulgar manu-
factures; nor does man select his dwelling, his clothes, or his companions without reference to their effect
on his aesthetic senses. Of late we have even learned that the forms of many animals are due to the
survival by sexual selection to the colours and forms most attractive to the eye. There must therefore
be in our nature a very radical and wide-spread tendency to observe beauty, and to value it. No
account of the principles of the mind can be at all adequate that passes over so conspicuous a faculty."
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for increasing their power or wealth or for effecting a desired distribution of any
one or all of the other basic values of the community, and, conversely, men may use
power and wealth in an attempt to produce a beautiful object or a use of land which
is aesthetically satisfying. It is solely because of man's irrepressible aesthetic de-
mands, for instance, that land with a view has always been more valuable for resi-
dential purposes than land without," even though a house with a view intruding
everywhere is said to be terribly hard to live in. Zoning regulations may, and often
do, integrate aesthetics with a number of other community objectives, but it needs
to be repeatedly emphasized that a healthful, safe and efficient community environ-
ment is not enough.' 8 More thought must be given to appearances if communities
are to be really desirable places in which to live. 9  Edmund Burke-no wild-eyed
radical-said many years ago, "To make us love our country, our country ought to
be lovely." It is still so today.
By assuming, however, that beauty is a matter neither subject to rational criticism
nor capable of measurement by precise standards, courts say that although indi-
viduals may desire beauty, or, more accurately, what they think is beautiful, com-
munity officials qua officials should not be allowed to force their own individual
"subjective," "non-measurable," "irrational" aesthetic preferences upon others through
use of the police power. This demand for precise criteria by which "beauty" can be
measured, which is at the bottom of the judicial refusal to recognize openly aesthetics
as a proper police power purpose, seems to be based upon a misunderstanding of
the meaning of words. In any event, it needs some looking in to.
This demand assumes that aesthetic inquiries must begin by asking for the
meaning of "beauty" and that only if this meaning is discovered can we possibly
THE SENSE OF BEAUTY, Intro. (1896), in I THE WORKS OF GEORGE SANTAYANA 5 (1936).
Some writers have suggested that judges are interested in achieving beauty in the syntax of legal
doctrine. See Llewellyn, On the Good, the True, the Beautifld, in Law, 9 U. oF Cm. L. REv. 224
(1942); Wolfson, Aesthetics in and About the Law, 33 Ky. L. REV. 33 (944); Frank, Words and
Music: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation, 47 COL. L. REv. 1259 (1947), and CouaTs ON TauAL
292 (949).
"In Miller v. Lawler, 66 N.W.2d 267, 269 (Iowa, 1954), the court enjoined defendant from
erecting a residence in violation of an alleged oral agreement that defendant would not erect a residence
obstructing plaintiff's " 'terrific' nine mile view to the south and west across vacant property owned by
defendant and to hills and woods beyond." The court held that to obstruct plaintiff's view would
irreparably damage his property.
" See the essays of Weinberg, Not by Bread Alone: An Evaluation of the Design Element in Large
Scale Planning, Gallion, Civic Design and Democracy, and DeMars, Townscape and the Architect: Some
Problems of the Urban Scene, in COLEMAN WooDntRY (ED.), THE FUrUREn OF Crrss AND URBAN RE-
DEVELOPMENT 52-99 (1953).
10 "The beauty of a fashionable residence neighborhood in a city is for the comfort and happiness of
the residents, and it sustains in a general way the value of property in the neighborhood. It is therefore
as much a matter of general welfare as is any other condition that fosters comfort or happiness, and
consequent values generally of the property in the neighborhood. Why should not the police power
avail, as well to suppress or prevent a nuisance committed by offending the sense of sight, as to
suppress or prevent a nuisance committed by offending the sense of hearing, or the olfactory nerves?
An eyesore in a neighborhood of residences might be as much a public nuisance, and as ruinous to
property values in the neighborhood generally, as a disagreeable noise, or odor, or a menace to safety or
health." State ex rel. Civello v. New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440, 444 (1923).
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praise or condemn particular objects in our environment. Since beauty has in the
past "proved notoriously refractory to definitive methods,"'2 it is easy to conclude
that we cannot rationally appraise objects as beautiful. But by asking, "what is
beauty?" courts have got themselves into the semantic bog which has long trapped
the aestheticians, who too often start their intellectual meanderings in pursuit of
that elusive will-o'-the-wisp: the true meaning of beauty.' This same bog lies in
the field of jurisprudence, except that judges rarely decide cases by inquiring first,
"what is justice?".
Words simply do not have the kind of meaning that judges (and philosophers)
are seeking when they ask, "what is beauty?'.22 Words are neither "things" nor
"ideas" that can be precisely measured; they have only uses or functions. The word
beauty means nothing by itself. To know the meaning of beauty is to know how
to use it in an intelligible way to describe phenomena within a given context. One
can meaningfully say, for instance, that Corot's "The Forest of Fontainebleau" is a
beautiful painting or that the cathedral at Chartres is a beautiful building, but it is
fruitless to ask if either is a correct use of beautiful2 Philosophy has many revela-
tions to offer but true meaning of word symbols is not among them.
That words have no single correct meaning points up that whether an object
or a relation is beautiful (or "equitable" or "reasonable") hinges upon the per-
spective of the persons using the word 4 This semantic indefiniteness does not, how-
ever, force us to the very extreme position of Humpty Dumpty (as some judges
assume it does in matters of beauty but not in matters of equity or reasonableness).
Of course, if a word cannot be intelligibly used by persons in communication then
Humpty Dumpty is right, but there are good psychological and cultural reasons why
the usage of words remains fairly stable,25 why people can and do meaningfully
use the word beautiful.28
What this adds up to is this. The cry for precise criteria might well be abandoned
because it does not make sense. Beauty cannot be any more precisely defined than
" CiAS. K. OGDEN AND 1. A. RICHARDS, THE MEANING OF MEANING 139 (1927).
"In general see KATHARINE E. GILBERT AND HELMfUT KUHN, A HISTORY OF ESTHETICS (1940).
"A stimulating examination of the language of aestheticians can be found in ROBIN G. COLLINOWOOD,
PRINCIPLES OF ART Cc. I, I, 12 (1938). See also CHAs. K. OGDEN, I. A. RICHARDS AND J. E. WOOD,
THE FOUNDATIONS OF AESTIETICS (1921); Morris, Esthetics and the Theory of Signs, 8 J. UNIFIED SCI-
ENCE 13X (1939); McKeon, The Philosophic Bases of Art and Criticism, 41 MoD. PHILOLOGY 65 ('943).
""Dogmatism in matters of taste has the same status as dogmatism in other spheres. It is initially
justified by sincerity, being a systematic expression of a man's preference, but it becomes absurd when
its basis in a particular disposition is ignored and it pretends to have an absolute or metaphysical scope."
THE LIFE OF REASON, Reason "in Art, c. io, in IV THE WORKS oF GEORGE SANTYANA 345 (Triton cd.
1936).
,An excellent exposition of the significance of perspective in aesthetic evaluations is the Gestaltist
Hungerland's Perception, Interpretation and Evaluation, io J. AESTHETICS AND ART CRITICISM 223 (1952).
See also note 33 infra.
" See generally P. A. SOROKIN, SOCIETY, CULTURE AND PERSONALITY: THEIR STRUCTURE AND
DYNAMUCS (947), and LESLIE SPIER, A. T. HALLOWELL AND S. S. NEWIAN (EDs.), LANGUAGE, CULTURE
AND PERSONALITY (1941).
"See Schrickel, A Psycho-Anthropological Approach to Problems in Aesthetics, 1o J. AESTHETICS AND
ART CRITICISM 315 (1952).
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wealth, property, malice, or a host of multiordinal words to which courts are ac-
customed. Planners can give reasons for saying a particular arrangement of objects
in the environment is beautiful based upon perspectives common in high degree
among the people in a community, but they cannot prove it, and proof which is
strictly unattainable should not be demanded. What is needed to decide whether
beautiful can be used in an intelligible manner by planners is not a foredoomed
search for precise criteria for its correct employment, but rather a clarification of
some of the operations indicating how the general public and planners use the word
and an evaluation of these operations by reference to community goals. It will
have to be admitted that a satisfactory set of operations describing what is beauti-
ful in the varying contexts of land use is not easy to come by. The problem of con-
triving definitions that meet the operational test of meaning is a complicated, difficult
business, for most of the relevant formal indices of beauty (such as symmetry, va-
riety, uniformity, balance, rhythm, simplicity, intricacy, and quantity) will have
to be further defined operationally." It is easy enough for planners to say, "Let
beauty represent the ratio of formal indices to function," but it is hard to know what,
if anything, they would be talking about.
Furthermore, in specifying and evaluating indices of attractive environments, it
is important that community decision-makers-judges and planning officials-realize
that they must promote land use which in time will succeed in appealing to people
in general. In public planning that environment is beautiful which deeply satisfies
the public; practical success is of the greatest significance. 8 In the long run, what
the people like and acclaim as beautiful provides the operational indices of what is
beautiful so far as the community is concerned. All popular preferences will never
be acceptable to connoisseurs who urge their own competence to prescribe what is
truly beautiful, yet it seems inescapable that an individual's judgment of beauty
cannot be normative for the community until it is backed with the force of com-
munity opinion. History may be of some comfort to the connoisseurs: widely
acknowledged great artists and beautiful architectural styles produced popular
movements and not cults 9 A great age of architecture has not existed without
the popular acceptance of a basic norm of design.
"'On operational indices in general see P. W. BRIDGMSAN, TE Loic OF MODERN PHYsIcs (1927).
For the development and application of a detailed set of aesthetic indices see GEORGE D. Bin-HOFF,
AEmETic MEASURE (1933). Birkhoff takes as his basic formula of beauty the ratio of complexity to
order. Complexity and order are refined psychologically and mathematically until specific formulae
emerge which are applied to various objects and designs, such as a polygon in vertical position, a simple
rectilinear ornament, and a vase. The results, although limited in scope, are closely in accord with
long-range critical and popular preferences. An earlier unsuccessful attempt to specify operational
indices is Hogarth's classic ANALYsis OF BEAUTY (1753).
'a See JoHN DEwEY, ART AS EXPERIENCE (1934). Compare with Dewey's pragmatics the transcendental
approach of Croce, who condemns "as erroneous every theory which annexes the aesthetic activity to the
practical." B. CROCE, As'riETC AS SCIENCE OF F_XPREsSION AND GENEEAL LINGUISTIC 50 (Ainslie transl.
1922).
" For divertissement, read John Wilcox's provocative account of how art without purpose and the
art for art's sake craze culminating in the dada (hobby-horse) cult of the twenties grew out of a mis-
interpretation of Kant's Critique of Judgment (1) by Madame de Sta~l and others. Wilcox, The Be-
ginnings of L'Art Pour L'Art, ii J. AESTHETICS AND ART CRITICIsm 360 (1953).
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Planning attractive communities need not necessarily mean the uniform imposi-
tion of the dreary middle-brow tastes of the Philistines. To a large extent artistic
preferences are a result of conditioning (not entirely, of course, since even the
marvelously adaptive human machine cannot become accustomed to everything).
Preferences are formed through what the psychologists call canalization, a type of
conditioning which eventually narrows the kind of stimulus that can satisfy a non-
specific demand. The demand will at first be rather general, but through environ-
mental conditioning only one or two stimuli will bring satisfaction. Beauty, as one of
the values sought by man, is one of his non-specific demands, and its satisfaction
is conditioned by his environment. Objects in the individual's aesthetic continuum
with which he identifies himself-to which he has become habituated-will more
likely satisfy his demand than objects with which he is unfamiliar. Individuals do
not like to impair the identifications of their personality structure, and for that
reason resist new designs.3 ' For the same reason, other changes in the environment
are resisted. Nevertheless, lively perspicacious leadership in the arts, such as has
been provided by the Bauhaus group, the Museum of Modern Art in New York,
and other community art centers interested in improving contemporary design, can
change-even "improve"--less educated "pedestrian" tastes (to use the jargon of art
criticism). The real need is for those who want to influence community artistic
preferences to examine, far more closely than has yet been done, the techniques by
which contemporary aesthetic opinion is, and could be, manipulated32
When an individual responds to environmental stimuli by applying the word
beautiful to particular objects, an enormous number of variables has influenced the
response. These include the specific qualities of the objects perceived (shapes,
colors, textures, arrangements, compositions, etc.), the physical and social context
of perception, the entire physical and psychological history of the individual,
and the values of the percipient and of the communityf3 All these and infinitely
more variables fuse into judgments of beauty. These judgments of beauty are like
all other appraisals in that they are made by individuals. They will vary. There is
no getting around the inherent limitations on man's power to reason which Kant
" There is an interesting discussion of this point in KuRT KOFFKA'S PRINCIPLES OF GESTALT PSYClIOL-
OCY 347 (1935).
2 For a lively history of the manipulation of American taste, see RuSSELL LYNVS, THE TAsMn-MAKIERs
(1954).
" As yet we have little good empirical description of the aesthetic evaluative process and of de-
termining factors in it. Pertinent but limited studies include: Eysenck, The General Factor in Aesthetic
Judgements, 31 BrT. J. PSYCHOLOGY 94 (1940), and Type Factors in Aesthetic Judgements, id. at 262
(1941); Henry, Art and Cultural Symbolism, A Psychological Study of Greeting Cards, 6 J. AsruSTrTcs
AND ART CRITICIsM 36 (1947); Gordon, Methodology in the Study of Art Evaluation, io J. AESTrEmcs
AN ARr CRarsCISM 338 (1952). Perhaps the difficulty is that in order to get at the problem at all it
is necessary to control the number of variables, resulting in a fatal oversimplification. This difficulty
is experienced also by lawyers attempting to describe and weigh the factors in judicial decision.
"Experimental aesthetics," sometimes called "psychometric aesthetics," was a behavioristic approach
emphasizing statistical studies of preference. Of it great things were expected, but little has come.
See A. R. CHANDLER, BEAUY AND HuMAN NAuRFE (1934); Farnsworth, Psychology of Aesthetics, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGY 12-25 (1946).
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demonstrated so many years ago. Still, is it necessary to conclude that because in-
dividuals are not perfect judging machines that imperfect but rational evaluations of
what land uses are conducive to an attractive community cannot and ought not to
be made? It is a pity that aesthetic disagreements cannot be resolved by reference
to absolute standards, for we should all feel so much more secure in our judg-
ments. What we need, however, to solve a value problem is not an illusion of an
absolute standard but decision-makers whose thinking is sufficiently disciplined and
whose technical training and knowledge of human beings are sufficiently extensive
to qualify them to pass judgment on the particular problem and to develop rational
techniques for implementing our generalized, flexible, relativistic community values.
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF VALUES
Consideration of some specific land uses which have been widely thought to be
aesthetically objectionable will show, perhaps, some types of aesthetic regulation ra-
tional community planning requires and how contemporary doctrine impedes the
efficient implementation of community values. It will become apparent that the ques-
tion of methodology of value implementation really needs far more extensive consid-
eration than it has ever received in the past and far more than can be given it here.
The following is intended to be more suggestive than comprehensive.
A. Control of Building Design
Many of the restrictions upon land use have, at one time or another, been said
to be for aesthetic objectives. Indeed, many years ago it was thought by some that
the main purpose of a city plan was to create a City Beautiful. Even today claims
that building restrictions such as minimum lot size and minimum floor plan pro-
visions have mainly an aesthetic purpose are not unusual, but here it would seem
almost impossible to separate considerations of beauty from considerations of health,
safety, and other factors? 4 Because these other objectives are so obviously involved
courts have usually sustained reasonable minimum size provisions and have not
recently struck down any provision of this type on the ground it was solely for an
aesthetic purpose. If minimum size restrictions are without the police power, it is
for some reason other than that their objective is aesthetic and thus a discussion of
minimum size provisions is not directly pertinent here.
There are, none the less, certain community restrictions on land use which ruins
the amenity of the neighborhood simply because it involves deviation from the
neighborhood scheme and is considered unattractive. People expect and demand
protection against deviations which they consider too ugly, and in new subdivisions
protect themselves with private restrictive covenants, 35 but in the older areas reliance
"' See discussion of the Wayne Township minimum size provisions and community objectives by
Haar, Zoning for Minimum Standards: The Wayne Township Case, 66 HAsv. L. REv. 1o5 (1953),
and by Nolan and Horack, How Small a House?-Zoning for Minimum Space Requirements, 67 HARV.
L. REv. 967 (954), and reply by Haar, id. at 986.
s HAROLD L. REEVE, THE INFLUENCE OF THE METROPOLIS ON THE CONCEPTS, RULES AND INSTITUTONS
RELATING TO PROPERTY 114-124 (1954).
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necessarily is to a large extent on the intervention of community officials. Examples
of these aesthetically motivated restrictions are requirements of two-story houses,"°
of conformity to building line,37 and of larger front yards in the quieter, more ex-
clusive residential areas with the least traffic s
Some cities with a distinctive architectural tradition have attempted to control
the architectural design of buildings by establishing a public body to pass upon the
design of private buildings. New Orleans,39 Williamsburg," Santa Barbara,41 and
West Palm Beach are examples. Apparently the only reported court test of an
ordinance of this type involved the West Palm Beach one, and it was held void as not
related to "health, welfare, safety or morals."4 It is clear that restrictions on building
design have aesthetic objectives in mind more than anything else; it also seems to me
that in certain contexts such restrictions may be reasonable means of policy im-
plementation.4 3
" Baker v. Somerville, 138 Neb. 466, 471, 293 N.W. 326, 328 (1940) (ordinance requiring two-
stories held invalid; "it resulted alone from aesthetic standards of the city lawmakers"); Brookdale
Homes v. Johnson, 123 N.J.L. 602, io A.2d 477 (1940) (ordinance requiring roof ridge to be at least
26 feet above foundation held invalid). Cf. 122 Main St. Corp. v. Brockton, 323 Mass. 646, 84 N.E.2d
13 (949) (ordinance fixing minimum height for buildings in business area held invalid).
" Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927) (ordinance sustained as reasonably related to public safety,
health, morals or general welfare). Cf. St. Louis Poster Advertising Co. v. St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269, 274
(199) (ordinance requiring billboard conformity to building line sustained, Holmes, J., saying, "Possi-
bly one or two details, especially the requirement of conformity to the building line, have aesthetic
considerations in view more obviously than anything else"). See cases collected in EUOENE MUQILLIN,
TsE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §25.138 (1950).
"' Sundeen v. Rogers, 83 N. H. 253, 141 Ad. 142 (1928) (ordinance requiring garages, pergolas,
and other auxiliary buildings to be built behind main house sustained on ground it promoted public
health and safety). Cf. In re Parker, 214 N.C. 51, 197 S.E. 706 (1938) (ordinance prescribing maximum
height of 6 feet for walls or fence in rear of residence sustained in its application to plaintiff, although
the city's superintendent of parks, a landscape architect, and plaintiffs neighbors all testified that
because of the unusual topography of plaintiff's lot his wall was in no way aesthetically objectionable).
See cases cited in McQuILLIN, op. cit. supra note 37, §25"140.
"The Vieux Carr6 Commission, by virtue of the Louisiana Constitution, Art. XIV, §22A (adopted
1936), has control "over the architecture of private and semi-public buildings erected on or abutting
the public streets of said Vieux Carr6 section. . . . [Without Commission approval no building can
be erected or altered in] appearance, color, texture of materials and architectural design of the ex-
terior...." See New Orleans v. Pergament, 198 La. 852, 5 So.2d 129, 130 (1941); New Orleans v.
Levy, 223 La. 14, 64 So.ad 798 (I953).
"'Williamsburg, Virginia, Ordinance No. 21, §23-45 (adopted 295!), provides that any building
erected "shall have such design and character as not to detract from the value and general harmony
of design of buildings already existing in the surrounding area in which the building is located or is
to be located."
"Santa Barbara, California, Ordinance No. 2228, §x (adopted 1949).
42 City of West Palm Beach v. State ex ral. Duffey, 158 Fla. 863, 30 So.2d 49r, 492 (x947). The
ordinance provided that "the completed appearance of every new building or structure must substantially
equal that of the adjacent buildings or structures in said subdivision in appearance, square foot area
and height."
' Caveat: "Because this is a new development, home builders are likely to feel that a provision for
architectural supervision is an unreasonable imposition, and in cases where the planning agency has no
expert architectural aid, this criticism will frequendy be justified. ...
"What success the California counties have had with this provision has been due largely to the
discretion with which planning commissions have used the power granted. In every instance architects
or other experts have guided the commission, and in virtually every case applicants for building permits
whose plans did not meet the approval of the commission have been persuaded that the changes sug-
gested were desirable. Without such careful and sparing use of the provision for architectural super-
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Our communities need to achieve an environment that is emotionally satisfactory,
that effects a reduction in purposeless nervous and physical tensions of the inhabi-
tants. When the inner life of an individual is out of balance, anxiety occurs, ex-
pressing itself in a number of socially destructive ways 4  Architecture, indeed
every object in the individual's aesthetic continuum, has a direct effect upon the
equilibrium of his personality and upon the happiness and richness of his life 5
Community officials need to become more aware of the significance design holds for
each individual and thus for society.
Zoning restrictions which implement a policy of neighborhood amenity should
be voided, if at all, not because they are for aesthetic objectives but only because
the restrictions are unreasonable devices of implementing community policy.
Whether, I repeat, an ordinance of this type should be declared invalid should de-
pend upon whether in the particular institutional context the restriction was an
arbitrary and irrational method of achieving an attractive, efficiently functioning,
prosperous community-and not upon whether the objectives were primarily aesthetic.
It is obvious that the task of determining whether a restriction is arbitrary and un-
reasonable is not an easy one, but it certainly is not made easier by theory which
turns a deaf ear to aesthetic effects. Before planners or courts can make a fully
rational decision, they need to hear arguments as to the effect of a proposed de-
cision on all community values. They need to know, inter alia, how the zoning
ordinance will affect the distribution of community wealth, especially neighboring
vision, the requirement would likely prove exceedingly dangerous." LEAGUE OF MINNESOTA MUNICIPALI-
TIES, ZONING, A GUIDE FOR MINNESOTA CITIES AND VILLAGES 10-11 (1952).
" For examples, see the pamphlet of the Park Association of the City of New York, VANDALISM
IN CrrY PARKS (1952).
" Strictly speaking, although confirmed on occasion by individuals who have subjected their personality
structure to depth study, this statement is common sense conjecture not based upon any empirical evidence
of the effect of the physical environment on personality. After a fairly comprehensive search, I am un-
able to find any good study of this problem and my colleagues in sociology and psychology tell me none
has been made. In his recent book, SURVIvAL THROUGH DESIGN 334 (1954), Richard Neutra suggests
what is needed. He calls for a five-fold investigation:
"i. To ascertain the force of influences of environment affecting the organism generally, not
through the senses. Special consideration will be given to stimulations that are man-made
or modifiable and therefore within the province of the art of design.
2. To clarify data on specific sensory responses, to show how the many senses work, singly
and in 'stereognostic' combination.
3. To study the relation of such sensory stimulation to an inner somatic equilibrium, which
is fundamental to our immediate well-being and our ultimate survival.
4. To study with care conditioned and associated responses elicited in our brain by simple
design elements.
5. To investigate with ever-greater refinement and dependability the interrelations of all re-
sponses, their superpositions, their colligations, configurations, and mutual interferences."
Among the books which provide some insight into the problem are: THOMiAS A. RYAN AND P. C.
SMITH, PRINCIPLES OF INDUSTRIAL PSYCHOLOGY C. 12 (1954); CHARLES M. HARSH AND H. G. SCHEICKEL,
PERSONALITY: DEVELOPMENT AND ASSESSMENT C. 1 (1950); DOUGLAS G. HARING (ED.), PERSONAL CHAR-
ACTER AND CUTURAL MILIEU (1949); L. B. MURPHY AND T. M. NEwComB, EXPERIMENTAL SOcIAL
PSU1CHOLOGY (937); Morgan, Human Engineering, in WAYNE DENNIS (ED.), CURENT TRENDS IN
PSYCHOLOGY (1947) ; JAMES S. PLANT, PERSONALITY AND THE CULTURAL PATERN Pt. I1 (1937); EnGAR
SYDENSTRICKER, HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT (933); CHARLES W. VALENTINE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY OP BEAUTY (1913).
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property values on which taxes and the financial security of the city depend, 40 how
the ordinance will affect the well-being of the community as a whole, including the
effect upon physical and mental health and safety of the residents, and how the
ordinance will increase the attractiveness of the community.4T They need to know
about matters which contemporary doctrine may exclude from evidence. 48
Undoubtedly courts do take aesthetics into consideration by smuggling aesthetic
effects into the judicial ken by a kind of "judicial notice" and evaluating them by a
mysterious and very inarticulate intuition. But too often this results in a court being
fooled by its own Gestalt; too often it results in a decision as to the reasonableness
or unreasonableness of an ordinance without careful consideration of extrinsic evi-
dence of its aesthetic effect. Are not the defects of a legal system in which words
do not match action, in which the gap between myth and decision is great, many and
patent?
B. Billboards, Gravel Pits, and Junk Yards
American prosperity owes much to advertising. It has played an important
role in creating the widespread demand for more creature comforts resulting in more
jobs, more volume for manufacturers and retailers, and, as Russell Davenport and
the editors of Fortune put it, "The Permanent Revolution"40 in the economic and
social organization of American communities. We should be appropriately cautious
about curtailing an activity which has been instrumental in increasing our wealth
and effecting a wider sharing of it, but where it conflicts with another community
value one has to give way. In the beginning, beauty was expendable, but the early
billboards were in such profusion and in such vulgar taste"0 that courts finally had
" See Sayre, Aesthetics and Property Values: Does Zoning Promote the Public Welfare?, 35 A.B.A.J.
471 (1949).
"LEws MUMFORD, THE CULTURE OF CITIES (1938), CATHSERINE BAUER, MODERN HOUSINO (934),
and COLEMAN WOODBURY (ED.), THE FUTUEa or CITIES AND URBAN REDEVELOPMENT (1953) contain a
wealth of information regarding the effect of community design upon the social, health and economic
structure of communities here and abroad.
"
8 E.g., in Neef v. Springfield, 380 11. 275, 43 N.E.2d 947 (942), the issue was the validity of a
Springfield ordinance prohibiting gasoline filling stations on Monument Avenue leading to Lincoln's
Tomb. The city officials "were permitted to testify ... that their chief concern was the preservation
of the beauty of the street." This testimony was dismissed by the Supreme Court of Illinois as "wholly
immaterial and incompetent." "The question here," said the court (at page 95o), "is whether or not,
disregarding the evidence relating to the beauty of the neighborhood and the streets and other aesthetic
purposes, the ordinance should be sustained on the grounds of public health, safety, morals or general
welfare." The ordinance was ultimately sustained.
" RussELL W. DAVENPORT ET AL., U. S. A. THE PERMANENT REVOLUTION (1951).
"Many of the early posters could fairly be characterized as suggestive or lewd, and after much public
pother these were subjected to the scrutiny of a censorship committee of the organized billposters. Like
all censors they sometimes outdid themselves. In England, for instance, the pictorial representation by
Bomril of an entire bull was condemned as likely to corrupt morals, and to this day only the bull's head is
used by Bovril. Other posters likely "to be embellished by the lewd artistry of the street loafer" were
ordered hung high. CYRIL SHELDON, A HISroRY OF POsTER ADVERTISING 70 (1937). See also Civic
LEAGUE o ST. Louis, BILLBOARD ADVERTISING IN ST. Louis (1910). The industry clean-up did not,
however, satisfy civic leaders and nature lovers who continued to produce a host of amusingly vitupera-
tive pamphlets. Almost any city library will have a collection of these.
Public distaste for billboards became so strong that the term is now verboten in the advertising
world. Modern husksters, scorning Shakespeare's dictum about a rose, insist that billboard has been
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to allow their curtailment, even though the protection of property interests was at
that time constitutionally in a preferred position. Today, most of the existing bill-
board blight is there by sufferance or inertia of community officials, since it is no
longer doubted that billboards in a wide variety of institutional contexts may be
regulated. By statute 17 states provide for comprehensive regulation,5 and x6 states
specifically provide for regulation by municipalities.5 2 Practically every large city
regulates outdoor advertising by ordinance or zoning law.53 All of the recent cases
indicate court approval of community intervention against billboards,54 a few lower
courts even saying as well as holding that the police power may be used to secure
aesthetic objectives. 5 This victory over ugliness is undoubtedly due largely to the
superseded by poster panel and painted display bulletin. One "spokesman" for the advertising trade
in a 3io page textbook on outdoor advertising (HUGH E. AGNEW, OUT-DooR ADVERTISING (1938)) men-
tioned billboard only once, to say the term was obsolete, and the Director of the Westchester County
(N.Y.) Department of Planning, in an appearance on a Philadelphia television station, was carefully
told not to use the word billboard as it might offend some of the clients of the station. In spite of
the billposters' efforts, the old-fashioned word remains firmly fixed in the vernacular.
" CAL. Cona, BuSNasS AND PROFESSIONS §5200 et seq. (Deering 1943, 1951 Supp.); CoLo. STAT.
ANN. C. 48, §403(1) et seq. (1953 Supp.); DaEL. Cona ANN. §riox et seq. (I953); D. C. CoDE §1-231
(195I); FLA. STAT. ANN. C. 479 (1952); Ky. REv. STAT. §147.080 (1953); ME. REv. STAT. c. 20, §Iu et
seq. (1944); MD. ANN. CoDE art. 56, §20o8 et seq. (95); MAss. GEN. LAws c. 93, §§29-33 (Michie,
1951); Nav. Comp. LAws §26o et seq. (Hillyer, 1929); N. J. STAT. ANN. §54:40-1 et seq. ('937);
N. M. STAT. ANN. §58-7o8 et seq. (1941); N. C. GEN. STAT. §io5-86 (949); TENN. Cona ANN.
§X248.I4, §5753 et seq. (Williams, 1941); VT. STAT. §7676 et seq. (1947); VA. CODE §33-298 et $eq.
(x950); W. VA. CoDa ANN. §1721(49) et seq. (1949).
"aCAL. GoV'T CODE §38774 (Deering, 1943, 1951 Supp.); CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. §837 et seq.
(1949); ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 24, §23-22 (Smith-Hurd, 1942); IowA CODE ANN. §368.6 (1946); KAN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§13-4o6, 14-431 (949); MicH. STAT. ANN. §5.2082 (1949); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§411.4o(8), 462.12, 463.X3(4) (i945); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§74.145(9), 75.110(42) (949); N. Y. VILLAGE
LAW §89(47) (McKinney, i95i); OHIo REv. CODE §715.27 (Page, 1953); R. I. GEN. LAws c. 375
(1938); TEx. Civ. STAT. art. 1175 (24) (Vernon, 1953); UTAH COD ANN. §10-8-39 (1953); VT. STAT.
§3847 et seq. (947); W. VA. CODE ANN. §591(83) (1949); Wis. STAr. §59.07(x6) (x!5).
" See CHARLES S. RHYNE, MUNIcIPAL REGULATION OF SIGNS, BILLBOARDS, MARQUEES, CANOPIES, AWN-
INGs AND STRET CLOCKS, REP. No. 137, NATIONAL INsTITrE OF MuNIcIPAL LAW OFscIERS (r952).
Gannon, The Law of Zoning Ordinances in Pennsylvania, 16 U. PrIr. L. REv. 168 (1955).
"Murphy v. Westport, supra note 8: General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Dep't of Public Works,
supra note ii; General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Indianapolis, 202 Ind. 85, 172 N.E. 309 (1930);
Perlmutter v. Greene, 259 N.Y. 327, 182 N.E. 5 (932). Other cases are cited in MIcQuiLLiN, op. cit.
supra note 37, §§24-38o-8. But cf. Mid-State Advertising Corp. v. Bond, 274 N.Y. 82, 8 N.E.2d
286 (1937).
" Commonwealth v. Trimmer, 53 Dauphin Co. Rep. 91, 1o5 (Pa. 1942): "We definitely hold ...
that aesthetic considerations alone, in this day, are sufficient upon which to base an exercise of the
police power." Preferred Tires v. Hempstead, 173 Misc. 1017, 19 N.Y.S.2d 374, 376-377 (940):
"Plaintiff lays stress upon the claim that aesthetic considerations are the basis for the enactment of the
ordinance in question and he quotes extensively from decisions in which the courts of this state have
veered away from sustaining similar enactments for aesthetic reasons only. . . . This court . . . would
not hesitate to sustain the legislation upon that ground alone. . . . Beauty tends to the happiness,
contentment, comfort, prosperity and general welfare of our citizens. . . . The courts should not
be so bound down with ancient precedent that they should close their eyes to every change." People
v. Wolf, N.Y.LJ. Dec. 23, 1925, affirmed, 22o N.Y.S. 656 (1926), reversing 127 Misc. 382, 2x6 N.Y.S.
741 (926), appeal dismissed, 247 N.Y. 189, 159 N.E. 906 (1928): "1i am of the opinion that an
ordinance prohibiting or regulating outdoor advertisements for the purpose of maintaining a certain
aesthetic standard is valid if reasonable under the particular circumstances of the community in which
it is to operate." The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court seems to be the only state court of last resort
which has come out and said plainly that proscription of some billboards "rested solely on the grounds
of taste and fitness" and which has held that on those grounds they may be regulated. General Outdoor
Advertising Co. v. Dep't of Public Works, supra note 11, 289 Mass. at 199-201, 193 N.E. at 822-823.
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growth of other more effective advertising mediums-newspapers, magazines, radio,
and television-with a resultant lessening of demand by business interests for bill-
board space and community protection.
Although much has in fact been accomplished, there is still a considerable amount
of confusion as to what community officials can and cannot do. Most courts
have not yet openly recognized that a rational decision as to which signs should be
protected and which prohibited in the interest of optimizing community values de-
pends upon a number of variables, chief of which is the environmental context.P0
One of the principal reasons for the present confusion about what signs community
officials can and cannot regulate is the failure of contemporary doctrine to make cer-
tain minimal contextual distinctions. The doctrine prohibiting zoning for aesthetic
objectives applies both to advertising in areas devoted to residential and recreational
functions and to advertising in manufacturing and retailing areas as if the context
were not important in determining community policy and how to implement it.
The doctrine fails to prescribe in what contexts advertising may be prohibited be-
cause not amenable to the environment.
Along with advertising signs are some other uses which in certain environments
are entirely out of keeping. Among these are gravel pits and junk yards, which
have been restricted by many communities. Ordinances prohibiting removal of
topsoil and excavation of sand and gravel have been dealt with by several courts in
the last 20 years. In New York, the ordinance of the town of Harrison, a wealthy
commuters' community in Westchester County, prohibiting removal of top soil
and excavation of sand, stone, and gravel was held to be an invalid exercise of the
police power because solely for an aesthetic purpose,57 but it is believed that on the
basis of later cases5" involving somewhat similar ordinances the holding in the
Town of Harrison case is of doubtful authority. In Massachusetts, the Supreme
Judicial Court, frankly recognizing the aesthetic factor, upheld a Burlington ordinance
prohibiting stripping of topsoil on the ground that unsightly land depressed the
taxable value of neighboring property." It seems probable that other courts will
"' In England outdoor advertisements may be prohibited only "in the interests of amenity and public
safety." See the Town and Country Planning (Control of Advertisements) Regulations, x948, Part
11(4), S. I. 1948, No. 1613.
" Town of Harrison v. Sunny Ridge Builders, 170 Misc. x61, 8 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1938). Cf. Lizza
& Sons v. Town of Hempstead, 175 Misc. 383, 23 N.Y.S.2d 8xi (1940).
5 8 Lizza & Sons v. Town of Hempstead, 69 N.Y.S.2d 296 (947), afflrmed, 272 App. Div. 921, 75
N.Y.S.2d I4 (2d Dep't 1947); Krantz v. Town of Amherst, 192 Misc. 812, 8o N.Y.S.2d 812 (1948);
Burroughs Landscape Const. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 186 Misc. 930, 61 N.Y.S.2d 123 (1946);
People v. Gerus, 69 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1942); People v. Calvar Corp., 286 N.Y. 419, 36 N.E.2d 644 (194).
"'Burlington v. Dunn, 3X8 Mass. 216, 221, 61 N.E.2d 243, 246, cert. denied, 326 U.S. 739 (1945):
..The stripping of the top soil from a tract of land . . . leaves a desert area in which for a long
period of time little or nothing will grow except weeds and brush. It permanently destroys the soil
for agricultural use and commonly leaves the land almost valueless for any purpose. The effect of such
an unsightly waste in a residential community can hardly be otherwise than permanently to depress
values of other lands in the neighborhood and to render them less desirable for homes .... It is natural
that a town of the character and situation of Burlington should endeavor to protect itself against such
consequences." Accord: Billerica v. Quinn, 320 Mass. 687, 71 N.E.2d 235 (1947). Whenever
courts talk about declining property values, it is, according to Norman Williams, Jr., Director of the
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follow here the view of the Massachusetts court, which has the distinction of having
written some of the most vigorous, realistic and illuminating opinions on the
question of zoning for aesthetic objectives.' As for junk yards, there is little doubt
that they may be kept out of residential areas. But may they be prohibited from lo-
cating in plain view of a well travelled highway? Two courts, reciting the traditional
anti-aesthetic doctrine, have recently said not 2 The problem of ugly junk yards in
view of highways is similar to the problem of billboards on highways which still oc-
casionally perplexes community officials trying to achieve attractive landscape design
within the confines of contemporary doctrine63 There may be excellent reasons for
promoting the aesthetic well-being of travellers on the highway;6" the British Parlia-
ment has found junk yards on major public highways so objectionable that it has re-
quired that they be attractively fenced in. On the other hand, there may be no
reasons. The point is, courts and planners need to hear arguments which they are
not now hearing.
There are of course variables other than area function which are relevant in
determining what is the most rational use of land. In areas in which outdoor ad-
vertising would seem perfectly amenable to the milieu, community officials may
find other good reasons for intervention. Take the recent cases involving prohibition
of overhanging signs in fashionable shopping areas.65 This prohibition is far more
difficult to justify in terms of area function than the prohibition of advertising signs
in residential areas, but it has caused courts much less trouble. The courts have
not resisted this phenomenon most probably because the community officials have
Planning Division of the New York City Department of City Planning, "a safe bet that either an
aesthetic or psychological nuisance is involved." Deficiencies of Zoning and Legal Decisions, PLANNING
164 (195o).
"The most famous, of course, is General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Dep't of Public Works,
supra note ii. This decision is discussed at length by Gardner, supra note I. The doctrine of that
case was extended in Lexington v. Govenar, 295 Mass. a, 36, 3 N.E.ad i9, 22 (1936), to uphold pro-
hibition of professional signs in residential districts: "Doubtless aesthetic considerations play a large part
in determining that advertising signs should not be permitted in such an area-these would seem
sufficient to exclude such a use." But cf. Barney & Casey Co. v. Milton, 324 Mass. 44o, 87 N.E.2d 9
(1949).
°' Vermont Salvage Corp. v. St. Johnsbury, 13 Vt. 341, 34 A.2d I88 (943); Pfister v. Municipal
Council of Clifton, 133 N.J.L. 148, 43 A. 2d 275 (1945). But cf. St. Louis v. Friedman, 358 Mo.
681, 216 S.W.2d 475 (1948).
"
5 In Ellis v. Ohio Turnpike Commission, x62 Ohio St. 86, aao N.E.ad 719 (r954), a Commission
resolution prohibiting the owner of land taken for the turnpike to place upon his remaining lands
"any billboard, sign, notice, poster, or other advertising device which would be visible from the
travclway" was invalidated as ultra vires and, in addition, was found too vague and ambiguous for
enforcement. By dictum the court said (at page 723) that with specific authority from the legislature
the Commission might prohibit billboards "in the interests of safety and to insure an uncluttered view
of the landscape." Compare Kelbro, Inc. v. Myrick, 113 Vt. 64, 3o A.2d 527 (x943), which held that
the abutting landowner had no right ("easement appurtenant") to have his advertising signs seen from
the highway unless they referred to business conducted on the premises. Also compare Perlmutter v.
Greene, supra note 54, holding state highway superintendent might obliterate view of billboard by
erecting blind in front of it on highway right-of-way. See Wilson, Billboards and the Right to Be Seen
from the Highway, 3o GEo. L. J. 723 (942).
"' See the MARYLAND LEGISLATIvE COUNCIL'REsEARCH REPORTS ON ROADSIDE CON-MtOL No. 5 (1940)
and No. 2o (1942); Olds, Billboards Along the Highways, 26 MICH. S. B. J. 15 (1947).
"5 See note 13 supra.
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acted here with merchant support, unlike the billboard cases, and a demand by hard-
headed businessmen for beauty is very hard to resist."6 With the burgeoning of con-
venient and attractive suburban shopping centers and the discovery that customer-
pleasing locales draw customers, downtown businessmen have become more than
ever alive to the need of making their stores attractive in appearance. The promo-
tion of beauty has become good business. Business support of art has not even been
entirely short-term self-seeking. Since the thirties, business has spent millions
pioneering the field of industrial designing and millions more in the promotion of
fine arts unrelated to industrial uses.67 In the name of public relations, good design
has become a major factor in the construction of the formerly drab and nondescript
office building. For instance, Lever House (home of Swan, Lux, Rinso, Surf, Breeze,
and Spry) was built on New York's Park Avenue with no first floor shops, usually
a source of considerable calculable income, in order to benefit-incalculably-from
public goodwill engendered by gazing upon a building which critics almost unani-
mously have praised with superlatives. No city today is without some building
undergoing a face-lifting-not because the old facade needs repair but because it is
ugly. Although this marriage of business and beauty is one of convenience and
may be severed at any time, if the coupling brings about open recognition of the
value of an attractive community, it will help secure more rational land planning
and thereby the achievement of more attractive communities.
CONCLUSION
If we want our children to grow up in pleasant purlieus, we must give up some-
thing of the freedom of the individual to use his land as he chooses. This is in-
herent in the concept of land planning by community officials. Nevertheless, I do
not wish to leave the impression that I think it either necessary or desirable that
community officials be arbiters in all questions of aesthetic preference which crop
up from the use of land. According to our basic social hypothesis, they should in-
terfere only when individual use seriously hampers the achievement of community
goals. If community officials instigate an artistic inquisition, it is certainly the
court's duty to oppose it, but the cases do not suggest that community officials have
acted rashly in attempting to improve appearances. In fact, they seem to have
lagged far behind public execration of eyesores,"' and when they have acted ex-
66 On this latter point it is interesting to compare the dictum in Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co.,
147 Fla. 480, 3 So.2d 364, 367 (1941) ("It is difficult to see how the success of Miami Beach could con-
tinue if its aesthetic appeal were ignored because the beauty of the community is a distinct lure to the
winter traveler") with the holding of the Florida court invalidating the West Palm Beach architectural
control ordinance, supra note 42.
67 "The Museum of Modern Art, for example, has fifty 'Corporate Members' who pay up to $Sooo a
year. The list includes such firms as Monsanto Chemical, I.B.M., Yale & Towne, Lord & Taylor, and
the Columbia Broadcasting System." RussELL LYNEs, THr TAsTE-MAKERS 299 (954).
6" So far, in fact, that the people of Santa Fe recently had to demonstrate the once fabled "law west
of the Pecos." According to the Santa Fe New Mexican of April 4, 1949, "The wind or the snow
or something smashed down three large billboards and six smaller ones along the road between Pojoaque
and the Otawi bridge last night. The big commercial boards were leveled as though cut by saws.
Two of the large signs had advertised whisky brands. The felling of the signs followed similar acci-
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tensive damage to community values has usually already been done. It is a pity,
but it is not entirely their fault. Without frank judicial acceptance of beauty as a
proper community objective attainable through use of the police power, the max-
imization of all community values is impossible and ordinances attempting to pre-
vent eyesores generally become makeshift and piecemeal devices.
Zoning doctrine is still in its formative period; the complexion of our land-
scape for a long time in the future will be determined by our present attitudes toward
zoning for aesthetic objectives0 It seems to me that something more is needed
than a case-by-case exception to the general rule, something approaching more
closely to a systematic theory of planning which will cover the presently widely ac-
cepted doctrines as well as develop new ones to replace those which are now causing
us trouble. A tabulation of differentiated factual situations in which restrictions
were judicially approved gives community officials a more penetrating insight into the
non-meaningfulness of our contemporary authoritative doctrine about aesthetics, but
if we would have anything approaching a scientific method in law, we need a body
of meaningful postulates and propositions, the efficacy of which is verifiable by case
results and evaluated by community goals. Those courts which postulate that the
police power may not be exercised for aesthetic objectives obscure the goals toward
which community policy is directed7" and hinder a determination of what types of
aesthetic regulation are required by rational community planning. An effective
doctrine for aesthetic zoning may, probably should, provide for careful judicial super-
vision of the exercise of planning powers in this field. But whatever norm is adopted
ought to be based upon an adequate recognition and description of the real factors
which motivate decisions of planning boards and courts.
dents to other boards set up in the locality where residents have taken a particular pride in the natural
scenery." The newspaper editorially deprecated this "lawlessness" but pointed out that "until there
is legal control of billboards, property owners and nature lovers will continue to handle the situation
with any means at hand."
"' In connection with the effect of doctrine upon the pattern of land use, Judge Jerome Frank
suggests that the growth of skyscrapers in this country has been materially aided by the doctrine that
easements of light and air may not be acquired by prescription (see Parker & Edgarton v. Foote, i9
Wend. (N.Y.) 309 (838); Depner v. U. S. Nat. Bank, 202 Wis. 405, 232 N.W. 851 (1930); Lynch
v. Hill, 24 Del. Ch. 86, 6 A.2d 614 (1939); Maioriello v. Arlotta, 364 Pa. 557, 73 A.2d 374 (95o);
Kulbitsky v. Zimmoch, 77 A.2d 14 (Md. i95o). In England the doctrine is to the contrary. Lemaitre
v. Davis, i9 Ch. D. 281 (1881). In a recent letter (dated Dec. 8, 1954) to the author, Judge Frank
states: "Had the English rule been accepted here, no one could have built a skyscraper in a large
city without buying up the easements of adjacent owners. Perhaps such purchases would have been
made. But the existence of such easements, and the expense involved in purchasing them, might
well have created an inertia sufficient to impede, at least, the development of those beautiful monstrosi-
ties."
"
0 Note the frank recognition of aesthetics by Mr. Justice Douglas in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33
(1954): "The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. . . The values it represents are
spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to de-
termine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as dean, well-balanced
as well as carefully patrolled. In the present case, the Congress and its authorized agencies have made
determinations that take into account a wide variety of values. It is not for us to reappraise them. If
those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well as
sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way." Although eminent domain
was involved here, the implications of the language seem very wide. The case may well provide the
needed watershed in the field of aesthetic zoning.
